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Transcendental Priority and Deleuzian
Normativity. A Reply to James Williams
Jack Reynolds La Trobe University
I am grateful that someone whose work I greatly admire could be the
philosopher to so eloquently and succinctly cut to the heart of the
problem that I posed in the previous issue of Deleuze Studies. James
Williams’ critical reply leaves me, prima facie, confronted by a stark
alternative: either I have misunderstood Deleuze, or I have illustrated
problems and lacunae in Deleuze. I will suggest, however, that this
is a false alternative, and that Williams’ and my divergent accounts
of The Logic of Sense – and even Deleuze’s oeuvre as a whole – is
better understood as a situation of ‘both/and’ rather than ‘either/or’,
and hence that my interpretation of Deleuze isn’t wrong, but necessarily
iconoclastic.
This is not to dispute that Williams has put forward a compelling
interpretation of the work of Deleuze (both here and elsewhere), but
if it can be said that my reading is mistaken at one level, let’s say on
the level of authorial intention and in regard to the most charitable
reading of some parts of some of Deleuze’s most important texts
(particularly Difference and Repetition), I don’t think I am mistaken in
maintaining that something like the hierarchical evaluative component
I describe (e.g. in relation to the virtual and the actual, and myriad
related polarities) persists in Deleuze’s work, despite the fact that
the important doctrines of ontological univocity and asymmetrical
reciprocal determination count against this. In this sense, I can agree
with Williams when he observes that ‘Privilege one or the other and
you have not understood your engine.’ But my suggestion would be
that Deleuze didn’t understand his own engine from time to time
(who amongst us consistently does?), and that while the contested term
‘priority’ ought to be understood neutrally by Deleuze as Williams
argues, quite frequently something else is going on in his texts, which
intermittently expresses itself (to greater or lesser extents), and which
philosophers like Hallward, Badiou, and myself, have attempted to
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thematise, albeit in quite different ways. Unlike Badiou, I do not think
Deleuze is a philosopher of eternity or the One, although I do agree that
there is, at times, a reification of the virtual in Deleuze. As for whether
I share Badiou’s desire to discredit the appeal to the virtual entirely
and speak instead of the univocity of the actual as a pure multiple, this
depends upon one’s conception of the transcendental, which I certainly
want to retain in some form, albeit of a more grounded variety – perhaps
something like an historical a priori – than that which is instituted by
Deleuze.
I think Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense evinces a hierarchical evaluative
tendency in many places, as is indicated in my essay. That said, Williams
does have me rethinking my account of counter-actualisation somewhat,
through the role he attributes to intensity as a kind of middle term
between the virtual and the actual, although I don’t think that the many
citations I make from Deleuze are thus all explained away. Nor am I sure
about Williams’ equation of intensity with the surface and the related
argument that the relevant opposition of The Logic of Sense is between
depth and sense (height) rather than between depth and surface. While
Williams is the expert in this regard, I also wonder how he explains
Deleuze’s remarkable essay, ‘Michel Tournier and the World without
Others’, where something like the virtual (or what Deleuze calls there,
apparently equivalently, the ‘perverse-structure’ and the ‘pure surface’)
is imagined as somehow instantiated, and a clear normative impetus
is accorded to this world that has dispensed with what he calls the
other-structure and its ‘relations of explication’. The other-structure is
envisaged as organising and regulatory: as ‘imprisoning elements within
the limits of bodies’ (Deleuze 2004: 351). Deleuze is even ‘tempted
to conclude that bodies are but detours to the attainment of images’
(Deleuze 2004: 352) and he asks, ‘when we desire others, are not our
desires brought to bear upon this expressed possible world which the
Other wrongly envelops, instead of allowing it to float and fly above
the world, developed into a glorious double?’ He intimates that perhaps,
‘the absence of the Other and the dissolution of its structure do not
simply disorganise the world, but, on the contrary, open up a possibility
of salvation’ (Deleuze 2004: 354). These are curious remarks that seem
to add weight to my interpretation that there is a value judgment
attached to this order of priority, rather than merely the neutral
transcendental priority that describes a difference between processes,
and I argue this in greater detail elsewhere (Reynolds 2008).
Nor is it that Deleuze is merely voicing the logics of Robinson Crusoe’s
perversion as they are presented in Tournier’s novel. After all,Difference
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and Repetition also refers to a leaving behind of the other-structure. And
Deleuze again derives an intriguing ethico-political injunction from this:
not to explicate oneself too much with the Other, and not to explicate
the Other too much, but to ‘multiply one’s own world by populating it
with all those expressed that do not exist apart from their expressions’
(Deleuze 1994: 260). On what basis then, does Deleuze derive his
injunction to multiply these possible worlds, these a priori expressed
others that have not yet been explicated, developed, subsumed within
the forestructures of our understanding and deprived of their difference?
It seems that the transcendental condition (the other as expressive of a
possible world) is simultaneously a moral injunction to maximise actual
occurrences of such expressivity. The spirit of this injunction is roughly
equivalent to that which accompanies his valorisation in Difference
and Repetition of the disruptive trauma of learning and apprenticeship
(Deleuze 1994: 192) and his references to the child-player who can only
win (Deleuze 1994: 116). I explore both these issues in another essay
(Reynolds 2006), but I will return to them here because the fundamental
differend between Williams and I seems to concern the issue of ‘coping’.
But for the moment my question for Deleuze and Williams is a
simple one: is the implied denunciation of relations of development
and explication justified? After all, while relations of explication might
come to domesticate the Other’s ‘otherness’ and to partially deprive
them of their radical difference, as Deleuze suggests, it is also the
case that they open up different and more diverse kinds of relations
(kinds of intensity) that cannot be captured on this view that juxtaposes
the relative purity of expressed ‘possible worlds’ that have no ties of
allegiance (that is, the different and the new), against their shutting
down and increased monotony in the world of identities. To put the
problem another way, even if the condition for relations of explication
(a quarrel, a revelation, anything that remains with the play of identities)
is the other as possible world, it does not follow from this that we
could or should live privileging this transcendental condition, or perhaps
even the intensities and singularities that this condition makes possible.
Indeed, while Deleuze himself repeatedly insists that there is reciprocal
asymmetrical determination between the actual and the virtual (which
means that neither legislates and draws up limits or rules for the other,
whereby we might obtain clear moral rules about what should take
place in the actual), in practice it seems to me that the virtual plays
the determinative role in his injunction to multiply encounters with the
expressivity of others. So, in response to Williams’ conclusion that as
philosophers we should not be too worried about normativity, I actually
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agree in a sense and I hope that I am no knight of good conscience,
but my critical essays on Deleuze are meant to be immanent critiques of
the intrusion of this surreptitious normative element in Deleuze’s own
work.
But Williams’ final remarks also pose perhaps a more pointed
challenge to my project, in that they call into question the value
of a negative philosophical engagement with another thinker in this
manner. I sometimes ask myself something like this question: Although
I disagree with many of Deleuze’s positions, I do not dispute that
he is a great philosopher, so why do I focus upon (or even misread,
according to Williams) aspects of his work that merely trouble me?
Is this petty procedure what a philosopher should do, living off the
backs of other long-dead philosophers? I don’t think there is a simple
answer to this question. I can point out in my own defence that this
is done in the hope that it will illuminate my own creations on these
lofty themes, particularly vis-à-vis time and transcendental philosophy,
the interconnection of which serves to distinguish poststructuralist
philosophy quite radically from much of what takes place in analytic
philosophy. Nonetheless, Williams’ questions make prescient to me that
we do have a different conception of philosophy, and that there is
a sense in which mine remains more closely related to what Deleuze
critiques as the model of judgment. After all, what I have been doing
in various publications on Deleuze is to work through some of my
intuitive concerns with Deleuze, and I mean intuitions in the standard
non-Bergsonian sense.
Now various questions and objections might be raised about this
modus operandi. If one is a Deleuzian about philosophical method then I
am likely to be exposing little more than my own encrusted assumptions
and prejudices, in short my subjective presuppositions. Another way
of putting this might be to say that one inevitably finds what one is
looking for, as in Heidegger’s version of the hermeneutic circle. Unlike
Heidegger, however, Deleuze thinks that there is a way out of this
dilemma, which is a version of both Meno’s paradox and the paradox
of analysis. Meno’s paradox roughly states that if we know what we
are looking for in advance, then when we find it we will merely confirm
what we already knew; and yet if we do not know what we are looking
for we will not know when we have found it and hence not know when
to stop our enquiry. The paradox seems to suggest that the learning of
something new is impossible, as is any kind of non-circular philosophical
enquiry.
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I think Williams and I agree that Meno’s paradox is misstated, but
for different reasons. For both of us, I imagine, the problem with this
conception revolves around the focus on knowledge (and the atomistic
understanding of what knowledge consists in). I resist this understanding
by turning to a phenomenology of the body as a way out from this
paradigm, whereas the Deleuzian move is to see intensity as a way out.
The latter route, though, depends upon a quite elaborate metaphysics in
a way that the former does not. Roughly put it requires a metaphysics
of difference and the new, along the lines enumerated by Deleuze in
his descriptions of the interrelations between the virtual and actual.
Moreover, I think it fair to say that on the latter route judgment is more
maligned than on the former route, where it is ‘disciplined’ by embodied
and practical concerns but not necessarily cast asunder. Of course, this
phenomenological route has been criticised, too, by Deleuze and others,
for remaining a form of doxa. That said, Deleuze’s engagement with
Merleau-Ponty is insufficiently detailed to be convincing in this regard,
but there is a minimal sense in which I think this is correct, as I have
argued elsewhere (Reynolds and Roffe 2006). But the key question
is whether doxa and common sense really ought to have nothing to
do with philosophy at all, as Deleuze supposes. If we accept that
conclusion, it would not merely be me, but most of us in academia, who
are either pretending to be philosophers or being poor philosophers. I
cannot justify this here but I find the Deleuzian critique of good and
common sense hard to accept in its entirety, despite it being an amazingly
powerful critical tool.
Vigilance about good and common sense is undoubtedly called for –
this is perhaps what Merleau-Ponty advocates under the name ‘hyper-
dialectic’ – but it is not clear to me that we can (or should) understand
the genuine philosophical pursuit as ultimately immured of these
aspects as Deleuze does. Likewise, Deleuze’s positive understanding of
philosophy as concept creation is also but one part of philosophy. Partly
because of these metaphilosophical reservations, I am not convinced of
the necessity for all of the metaphysical moves made in the Deleuzian
philosophical system. Williams, however, has seen the necessity for the
Deleuzian transcendental and metaphysical turn and I think that is what
is at stake in his disagreement with me in regard to coping.
Williams not only shows the manner in which we need to understand
intensity as a middle ground between virtuality and actuality, but he also
tells us that intensity must be understood in disjunction from coping (or
scarification in the terms of my Deleuze Studies paper), which on his
view is a reactive rather than creative force and its teleological impetus
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precludes new intensities and creative affirmations. I am still not totally
convinced about the severity of this Deleuzian distinction between habit,
skill acquisition, and learning – Deleuze and Bergson might argue that
they involve differences in kind, but I see differences in degree – but I do
see where Williams is coming from when he states:
When has cultural context not involved creativity and novelty? When was
learning from contact with others not a form of practical wisdom? When has
embodiment been ‘given’ rather than undergone as a shifting experience of
varying intensities? Only if you retain too much nostalgia for norms in your
practice – and your account of the given – can you hold such views.
I am certainly prepared to accept that there is always some minimal
creativity/change at work in any given environment, whether socially
or naturalistically conceived. I should also add that I don’t maintain
that embodiment is given in anything but a very minor sense. I know
from my one year-old daughter just how much we take for granted
about ‘normal’ bodily motility when at one stage these activities were
far from normal. All bodies – human and animal – have a minimal
proprioceptive sense from the ‘beginning’ (i.e. the earliest stages of foetal
life), that is, an unrefined positional awareness, which serves as the
basis for the development of a body-schema, habits, and even intelligent
skills and learning, as we seek to establish maximum grip, or optimal
gestalt, with a given multiplicity. In a sense, Williams is right to say
that adjustment towards one’s environment is the telos of learning and
skill acquisition on this view, but this does not necessarily precludes
change and transformation, indeed our skills must be flexible enough
so as to respond to difference. It is even arguable that it is only with
certain abilities and capacities made possible by the body-schema and
the acquisition of habits and skills that one can be truly attentive to the
singularities that present themselves.
But this is not the view of Deleuze (or Williams) whose models
of intensity are the trauma of apprenticeship and the experience of
disequilibrium and discontinuity. Williams states that coping is ‘always
an illusion given the gradual degradation and hope for an end implied
by the term’. These are strong words. In his view, coping is an illusion,
a phenomenological illusion that covers over deeper intensities. Even
if this were so, I’m not sure in what sense coping can be said to be
an illusion unless we understand the virtual alone as real, something
that Williams would not want to do. Equally strongly, Williams also
contends that any philosophy that pays attention to this experiential
phenomena is irremediably nostalgic. Against this view, I hold that this
Transcendental Priority and Deleuzian Normativity 107
embodied maintenance of intentional arcs is a fundamental part of both
human and animal existence, even if transcendental arguments can be
mounted to show that there is a neutral order of priority that conditions
it. Am I nostalgically invoking the myth of the given in insisting on the
value and importance of this embodied ‘coping’ or ‘l’habitude’? I don’t
think so. It may enact a form of ‘presentism’ in that one responds to
circumstances with a view to optimal gestalt, but I don’t see why it is
incurably nostalgic. Moreover, I do not, of course, want to maintain
that it exhausts the dimensions of human life, or life per se. Indeed,
much of my work insists on the co-imbrication of these two tendencies
– equilibria and disequilibria – and is hence meant to be a corrective
to what I take to be the Deleuzian view that downplays the centrality
of habits, coping, and the acquisition of skills to both learning and to
ethics/counter-actualisation (the embodied phronesis I talk of is based on
the specificities of the human body-schema and the feedback mechanisms
it makes possible).
I suspect that there is something akin to a differend here between my
still too phenomenological account and a Deleuzo-Bergsonian response
which might pose the following questions about my apparent reification
of actual proprioception and what it means for animal organisms:
What about embryology? What are the conditions of actualisation of
bodies? Do we not need reference to the virtual? I cannot satisfactorily
address these questions here, but there is certainly an important
difference between a phenomenological and a more metaphysical
account of intensities (and the virtual) working with the variabilities
of an environment to produce bodies. If this is so, what separates
Williams and I is less the desire for some series of rational or ethical
norms, but, as he discusses in regard to Deleuze and David Lewis in
The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze, the differences between two
kinds of pragmatism. Rather than align myself with Lewis, the relevant
contrast is perhaps better exemplified in terms of the differences between
a metaphysical and experiential pragmatism of the Bergsonian variety,
and a more mundane pragmatist view which sees ‘know how’ as more
fundamental than ‘knowing that’, with all of the various consequences
that this entails. Indeed, despite the admiration that William James
consistently expressed for Bergson, there is a sense in which Bergson
was right to be wary of James’ declarations of intellectual kinship
and to insist on the differences between their respective philosophies.
It seems to me that some similar differences are at work between
James Williams and myself. The fact remains that some aspects of
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the Deleuzian metaphysical leap are not yet ones that I have seen the
necessity of taking, either intellectually or experientially.
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